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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral George W. Baurenschmidt, U.S.N.
at the Naval War Colle�
February 16, 1950

In the last war production as a problem was solved very
early, but the problem of distribution was not solved. Transporta

tion is a major component of distribution. Traffic management
is a major component of transportation. My subject today is

"Traffic Management." But it cannot be discussed without a dis
cussion first of transportation as it pertains to logistics.
We are. accustomed to thinking of war in terms of fighting,

but you here at the Logistics Course of the War College must by
now recognize that the major part of modern war is logistics, and
transportation is a big part of logistics. The statistics of trans

portation in the Second World War are impressive and colossal.
Cargo and passenger ships outnumbered fighting ships many
times over. The Army, which depended almost entirely on truck
transportation in the European theater, had 30,000 men just op
erating railroads in that theater. The tonnage hauled away from
the United States for the war effort can be represented as half a

thousand billion ton miles, while inside the United States the
railroads alone in one year hauled three quarters of a thousand

billion ton miles. The Navy each day during the war turned over to

carriers in the United States an average of 100,000 tons of material.

These statistics are not only colossal, they are beyond comprehen

sion just as is the National debt, which, in no small part, represents
transportation costs.

I cannot stress too much the point that in

modern war, transportation is a factor to be given ever greater
Admiral Baurenschmidt is Deputy Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
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consideration for its importance; cost, and.effect grow 'and grow. as
new techniques of war develop. The soldier of Caesar's Legions
furnished his own transportation and lived off the land, but in the
intervening 2000 years since the days of t,hese Legions, such things .
as gun powder, petroleum, feeding habits and spare parts have
made transportation a matter of grave concern· to the military
leader.

Transportation is a chain of many links including the actual
media of movement such as trucks, trains, planes and ships, and
including terminals, ports, landing fields and storage facilities. In
time of war, or any other time of maximum utilization of trans
portation, all links of this chain must be of equal strength. Thus

the capacity of railroad cars serving a port must be matched by
port capacity, ship capacity, and finally capacity at the terminal
at the other end of the overseas haul. A bottleneck anywhere re
duces the efficiency of the whole. The result of imbalance was con
spicuous in the First World War when there w�s an actual back
ing up of 200,000 loaded freight cars at New York because of in
sufficient port facilities and vessels capacity. To give you some
idea as to what 200,000 freight cars constitute in the way of a
block to traffic, they jam the facilities of the railroads from New

York all· the way back to Pittsburgh.

Proper balance between

the links of transportation can be maintained in some pa� by the
carrier operators, but by far the greater agent in maintaining this

balance is good traffic management.

The Second World War shows that much has been learned

from the lessons of the first great war.

There were no serious

breakdowns in transportation even though imbalances did exist,
and to show you that imbalance did· exist and in part to indicate

how they weretaken care of, I can state that Navy material await

ing transportation across the Pacific was backed . up for want of
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shipping, backed up as far as Illinois, but the effect of this back
up on transportation was kept to a minimum by the expedient of
retaining the material in warehouses. In other words whenever
it became apparent that the material could not be moved forward
beyond a certain point, it was placed in warehouses until it could
move forward and so the Navy operated warehouses from San
Francisco to Illinois.
Just as there were lessons to be learned from the First
World War so are there lessons to be learned from the Second.
Two of these are : first, there is a need for more intelligent use of
port facilities, and second, there is a need for the use of more
ports with less emphasis on the large ports. Under the National
Security Resources Board there is an agency studying the Na
tion's needs for transportation in the next war and the means to
best satisfy those needs. This agency, come the next war, will
probably be the successor to the Office of Defense Transportation,
which operated in the last war. The name of this agency is Of
fice of Transportation and Storage. It is planning port-utilization
now and has established rules and an organization, which should do
much to promote maximum port utilization. In the last war we
shipped most of our cargo through the East Coast ports of New
York, Norfolk, Boston and Philadelphia, and through the West
Coast ports of San Francisco, San Pedro, Seattle, and Port
Hueneme. The disadvantages of this type of operation are self
apparent. First, such concentration of war material and transporta
tion facilities offers excellent targets in the age of atomic warfare.
It also narrows the hunting fields of the wolf packs of submarines.
Just as important as the first two is the fact that this restrictive
use of the Nation's port facilities overtaxes the ones that are used,
the railroads that serve them, while leaving comparatively idle
many smaller ports and the railroads serving them. It is the
Navy's intention, and I have been assured that it is the intention
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In other words, it is not merely sufficient that he balance the charges
of one carrier against those of another but he must also include such
items as the cost of packaging required for each mode of travel,
and such items as stevedoring. When using premium transporta
tion to achieve speed, he must not only weigh need against cost,
but he must provide for, or insure that, his package is transferred
to a more reliable but slower means of conveyance whenever the
premium type carrier is unable to perform.
The matter of cost of transportation is not the simple one
of inquiring of each carrier what he will charge to haul a specific
load of freight. The tariff structure is complicated and a rather
wide field for negotiation even though rates have been published.
The Armed Services have been subjected to a fair amount of criti
cism because they failed to negotiate in transit rates for tre
mendous amounts of material moved during the recent war. I can
describe an in transit rate somewhat in this fashion. Short hauls
cost more per mile than do long ones, but when material is des
tined to make a long haul, which is interrupted, the carrier may
legally charge the short haul rate, but the user may demand and
get the long haul rate.
Suppose, for example, Mechanicsburg is shipping engine
parts to San Francisco, but these parts should be added to other
parts at Clearfield to form full kits. If the Navy claims in transit
privileges it may ship the parts to Clearfield where Clearfield
works on them for several weeks and then sends them on in kits to
San Francisco. The Navy may claim through rates for the parts
from Mechanicsburg to Clearfield and for that portion of the ship
ment from Clearfield to San Francisco which represents the origi
nal parts. Involved also in the matter of rates is the commodity
classification. Rates have been established for each commodity. It
is incumbent upon the shipper to designate his shipment as falling in
RESTRICTED
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that commodity group which is both appropriate and carrying
the minimum rate. To illustrate this point, I cite the case of the
man who went to the cereal manufacturer and stated that he could

save him large sums of money. The manufacturer was skeptical
but finally entered into a contract which proved to be lucrative to
both the manufacturer and the man. The man's proposal was
that the manufacturer stop calling his product the shredded wheat
biscuits and merely call it shredded wheat, because under the first

.name the product took the tariff for bakery products since it was
called a biscuit, while under the second name it took the much lower
tariff for cereals. The services have been criticized for failing to
take advantage during the recent war of in transit privileges and
proper commodity classification. It is true that leisurely analysis
after the war can show that a billion dollars could have been saved
by better traffic management but so can every Monday-morning
quarterback prove to you how last Saturday's game could have been
better played.

Traffic management has been defined many times. I shall
give you a definition which may be over-simplified, but which focuses

attention upon its salient features. Traffic management is the
science of procuring for the shipper the cheapest possible transporta
tion consistent with delivery requirements in times of· peace, and,

especially in time of war, securing the greatest and most effective
utilization of carrier capacity.
This appears to be the age of centralization in government,

and that in spite of the fact that almost a generation ago big busi

ness found that over-centralization was costly, and big business

has long since decentralized in many areas. We·are urged today to

centralize under one head all transportation controls in the Navy.
Then to centralize under one head all transportation controls for the

Army, Navy and the Air Force. And finally, we. are .told to central-
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ize under one head all transportation controls for the Department

of Defense and for all other Government departments. And yet
during the recent war both the Army and Navy found it necessary
to decentralize their transportation controls to agencies in the field.
Some concentration is indicated.

to be seen.

How much there will be remains

As of the moment there has been formed a Central

Military Land Traffic Office to perform under the administration
of the Army certain functions which the Army, Navy and Air
Force were mutually agreed could be centrally performed and yet

leave to each of the three departments those functions of traffic
management which each of the three services at present believe
essential to its own adequate operation. Some of these functions
are: (a) Negotiation of rates and charges on after-the-fact ship
ments, (b) Issuance of freight classification guides, (c) Negotia
tion of rates and average demurrage agreements, (d) Issuance of
export release permits under conditions of war or emergency only,
(e) Exchange of information as to availability of service-owned
equipment to promote maximum use, (f) Operation of freight

consolidating and distributing stations if and when established by
mutual agreement in times of war or emergency. To the functions
assigned to the Central Military Land Traffic Office can be added
other functions when the three departments are satisfied that it
is appropriate to lodge them there. Should the departments feel

that any of the present functions are improperly lodged in that
Office, they may be removed and restored to the several depart
ments. So far the operation of this central office appears to be
satisfying all three services. Further, it is hoped that by the im
provement in their operations the three departments may satisfy
the General Services Administration and other agencies of the Gov
ernment that it will be unnecessary to centralize any traffic manage
ment of the three military departments in any other agency of the
government.

The three military departments are already of the

opinion that it would be unwise so to do.
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Just as there are some in the government who are clamor
ing for centralization and more centralization, so are there those
who within the Department of Defense advocate that transportation
be divided between its three major media and assigned to the three
departments. Under this concept the Department of the Army
would budget for and operate all land transportation, while the De
partment of the Navy would budget for and operate all sea trans
portation, and the Department of the Air Force would perform sim
ilar functions for all air transportation. This theory, like many
another theory before it, sounds very attractive and plausible.
Those who advocate it persuade many, but never do they persuade
one who has a sound comprehension of traffic management. There
are many sound arguments against this compartmentation or frag
mentation of traffic management. I can illustrate the general tenor
of most of them by stating that it is essential that one brain or
group of brains direct the routing of a single shipment from its
point or origin to its final destination. Let us assume that traffic
management has been fragmented into its three components. Let
us consider a single shipment that involves only land and sea trans
port. And let us suppose that this shipment originates in Ohio and
is destined for Tokyo. First it falls into the hands of the land
transportation traffic manager. He is interested in getting this
shipment to tide water and off his hands in the minimum time and
at the minimum cost. He, therefore, routes it from Ohio to Hamp
ton Roads. This does not suit the sea transport people for it in
volves the long haul from Hampton Roads through the Canal and
out to Tokyo. The sea transport people would much prefer that
the shipment be consigned to San Francisco where they can pick it
up and carry it to T'okyo for the cheapest rates and in the shortest
time. If, however, a single brain is planning the movement from
its point of origin to its destination, this brain might well balance
all time and all costs and arrive at the solution that the cheapest
over-all routing within the allowed time would be to ship by rail
38
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from Ohio to New Orleans, and by sea from New Orleans through
the Canal to Tokyo.

There are similar arguments predicated upon

problems involved.

The operation of sea transport has been as:.

the use of premium transportation and others upon the budgetary

signed to the Navy, and the operation of MATS has been assigned

to the Air Force. · Regretably there are no major land carriers
which are owned by the Department of Defense and the operation
of which could be assigned to the Army.

though the Army has been short changed.

It, therefore, looks as
Unless I have missed

some important point the probability is that within a very few
years the Army will find that it has gained rather than lost in this
assignment for it looks very much as though the Navy will ulti

mately be required to assume budgetary responsibility for MSTS
and the Air Force a similar responsibility for MATS leaving the

Army unburdened with any similar responsibility since all three

services are required to budget for their land transportation. Those

who advocate fragmentation of transportation do so because they
mistake carrier operation for traffic management.

It is the first

which has been assigned and not the second and there is no direct

relationship between the two.

Unfortunately it is not only those

who cannot differentiate between carrier operation and traffic man

agement who are advocating this fragmentation.

There is also a

group of people who would expand their own empire.
finger at no one department.

I point the

All three have their empire builders

in the fields of transportation.

It is perfectly true that in assigning carrier operations to

the Navy and to the Air Force certain traffic management functions
have gone to those two services incident to this assignment.

These

traffic management functions are essentially those of routing once
the cargo has been made available to the carrier.

In the case of

MATS this is of little significance in view of the fact that the

charter of private planes has been reassigned by MATS to the
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three departments, MATS only retaining clearance to be sure that

chartered planes are used to maximum capacity. In the case of
MSTS the three departments, as shippers, have the right to lay

down their cargo at any port they choose. From there on it be
comes the responsibility of MSTS to deliver the cargo to its over
seas destination and in the time specified. MSTS has the choice of

using ships of its own or of using commercial bottoms. Those who

advocate this system say that, in effect, MSTS has embraced all
ocean carriers and, in effect, there is only one carrier. Hence,
routing is a matter of little, if any, concern to the shipper. I, for
one, do not agree with this and am actively advocating that the
three departments each pay for their cargo which is shipped in
commercial bottoms at tariff rates and that they retain the right

to specify that their cargo shall go by such shipments and on such
ships as they select with MSTS merely negotiating the contract
for the lift. If this is done, each service will have retained all that

is essential in traffic management.

Incident to the effect of unification on military transporta
tion the question of priorities in traffic management has received
considerable notice and to date there is no generally agreed upon

policy with regard to priorities. Since priorities in many instances
determine the sequence of shipment and in other cases result in

premium transportation, it is obvious that there is need for an ac
cepted policy with regard to them. One school of thought advo

cates priorities predicated upon categories of material. Under this
concept, for example, bullets might always precede beans, and
beans always precede general stores. It may be perfectly true that
under normal conditions, ammunition is more important than food,

and food is more important than general stores, but this is not al

ways so and we come to the belief of the second group who main

tain that priorities are predicated upon need and not upon cate

gories. Why should ammunition, they say, always come first when
40
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you may have plenty of ammunition and not enough food? Or why
should ammunition and food both come ahead of general stores
when you may have plenty of ammunition and food and be in dire
need of general stores? So they say that priorities are predicated
Upon need and further that only the shipper, or the owner and user
of the material, can determine need. This issue I hope to see
settled in the very near future and settled by the establishment of
the policy that need determine priority.
No discussion of traffic management would be complete
without consideration of the newest medium of transportation,
namely, air lift, and on no subject in the field of transportation is
their wider divergence of opinion, than there is on the matter of
air lift. First, we have those who advocate it because they believe
in anything pertaining to air, and those who oppose it because they
have never been satisfied that the airplane is here to stay. There
are those who distort the incomplete statistics of air lift during the
war to prove any point of view they may happen to take, but air lift
is here and it is here to stay. The question to be answered is, to
what extent can it be relied upon and how can it best be used. The
statistics of the last war are really of little help. First, few sta
tistics w�re collected because people were more interested in getting·
the job done than in recording what it took to get it done. Next,
air lift just grew and it grew in an unplanned but surprisingly rapid
fashion. And, third, there were many flagrant misuses of air lift,
some through lack of understanding of its potentiality and of its
cost and some through downright selfishness. There are many of
us who operated in overseas supply fields during the war who re
member. being denied air lift for vitally needed supplies only to
find that the next incoming plane was loaded with a mahogany bar
and slot machines for some air :field being established, or with
wolf bait for some VIPs in the big cities of the ETO. Be that as
RESTRICTED
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it may, the recent war convinced us that air lift was a factor in
modern logistics.
As of the present our approach to air lift is not too intelli
gent and our thinking on that score can be illustrated by the con
clusions reached by a certain clergyman who found himself con
fronted by a couple desiring to be united in matrimony. Their ap
pearance led him to inquire of the groom his age, and when the
response came forth, "75," the clergyman asked "and why, sir, do
you desire to be married?" The prospective groom said "Because
I want an heir." The clergyman then turned to the prospective
bride and asked her age. When told that she was 68, he asked her
why she wanted to be married, and she said that she too wanted
an heir. This led the clergyman to come to the conclusion that
the couple were "heir-minded," but not "heir-conditioned." And
so it is with our thinking. We are air minded but not air conditioned.
We ship by air in part as an attempt to make up for mistakes in
planning. We ship by air because we know that air travel is fast.
We have yet to analyze our air lift and find out to what degree it
is dependable, when air cargo is grounded how rapidly can we move
the cargo to other means of travel, what is the true cost of air lift,
what actual saving in time can be counted upon and what categories
of material are best suited for air lift? When we have the answers
to these questions and we apply them properly, air lift will be on a
much firmer and more satisfactory footing.
The true cost of our military air lift today is staggering.
The reliability is very low. The average time saved is very little,
but if we take the time to do some research, we will find our present
cost of military air lift well worth while, and when I speak of re
search I am speaking of research in the actual operation of a
carrier service and in the actual traffic management which accom
panies it. I am not one of those who believe that in the next war
42
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we can dispense with supply depots and we can dispense with ships,
all because everything will be brought by air immediately from the
factory to the consumer's hands. I am one of those who believe
that · substantial quantities of high priority cargo will and must
be transported by air, and to do this satisfactorily we must have

uniform documentation, we must have a route pattern to serve the
customer's needs, operational performance must be measured in
· terms of customer satisfaction not in terms of pilot satisfaction.
Parenthetically I define pilot satisfaction as on;..time departures plus
flight safety plus a high degree of aircraft utilization and similar
factors. And, :finally, we must have some rules qf thumb by which
we can readily determine when the expenditure of fuel and the use
of expensive equipment involved in air lift are warranted. In other
words we must know when we should ship by air and when we
should not ship by air. We need cargo aircraft designed for spec
ific ranges and specific loading and discharge conditions. In short
what I have said about air lift is that it is an infant, a lusty in
fant it is true, but nevertheless an infant.

Many of the schemes to achieve economy, which have been
presented to the Department of Defense in the name of unification,
would be perfectly sound if the Department of Defense were a busi

ness, the objective of which was to show� profit. But when they de
crease.the effectiveness of the Department of Defense as a military
organization, they are without merit and definitely detrimental. The
flaw in many of the schemes pertaining to logistics lies in the fact
that all areas of logistics must be responsive and responsible to the
tactical and strategical commanders, and these schemes do not recog
nize this fact. Transportation, being one of the components of logis
tics, must be also responsive and responsible to command. This is true
in peace of traffic management and in war it is true of both carrier
operations and traffic management. It is for this reason that I stated
earlier that the three military departments are already of the opin
ion that it would be unwise to centralize the traffic management of
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the three military departments in any other agency of the Govern..
ment. This is also the reason why each of the three military de
partments in establishing the Central Military Land Transportation
Office reserved unto themselves the most important functions of
traffic management. It is a self-evident fact that the efforts of the
strategists and of the tactician are of no avail even though with
the utmost brilliance they bring their forces to bear at the critical
point and at the crucial time if those forces are without reserves
and without supplies. The military commander must have as
surance that his reserves of personnel and his requirements for
supplies are delivered to him when and where he wants them, as
well as in the quantities that he requires. It is transportation
which gives time-place utility to material and per�onnel. !tis time-
place utility that the commander requires. He must be complete
ly sure, therefore, of his transportation and in order to be com;.
pletely sure his transportation must be a component of his com
mand subject to his will.
During the recent war the Army established a Transporta
tion Corps. It was the mission of this Corps both to operate carrier
services on land and sea and to act as traffic manager for the ma
terial and personnel of the Army when in transit. The people who
constitute this Corps are exceptionally able in their field. The job
they did during the war was outstanding, but having moved abroad,
returned to the United States and then moved elsewhere abroad fab
ulous quantities of material and tremendous numbers of persons,
these people made the mistake of believing that they were operating
a distribution system, particularly with respect to supplies, and
since the war ended they have spent a great deal of time developing
what they call the "factory-to-soldier program." They are excellent.
traffic managers and I have pointed out that traffic management
requires skilled technicians in a highly complex field, but they have
overlooked the fact that the control of the distribution of material
44
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requires just as highly trained technicians in a field quite as com
plex and possibly more extensive. Careful analysis will show that
traffic management is a tool of supply just as carrier operations are
a tool of traffic management.

In summation I wish to stress the following points:
(1) Transportation is a large part of logistics, and logistics,
according to Field Marshal Montgomery, is 85% of modern war.
(2) Transportation is a function of command.
(3) Transportation is a chain, and in times of maximum use its

links should be of equal strength.

(4) The traffic manager must be a highly trained and skillful

technician for traffic management is very complex indeed.

(5) Effectiveness being the all important criterion of a military
machine, consolidations predicated upon economy without effective

ness are fatal.

(6) The shipper should be able to exact from the carrier the
service he requires and the services of the carrier should be

predicated upon the needs of the shipper and not upon the con
venience of the carrier.
(7) In modern traffic management air lift should be neither

over-emphasized nor ignored.
be watched and stimulated.

It is an infant whose growth should

(8) Transportation is a tool of supply, not the director of

supply.

(9) Finally, I offer the point that the logistician must have a

real appreciation of traffic management, but he should not attempt

to be a traffic manager. The man who defends himself in court has

a fool for a client, and the logistician who does his own traffic
management is no logistician.
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